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Givoni, Moshe. Chen, Xueming.

From destinations where there is either a HSR or a flight service to the hub (56 in total),
the level of service is relatively low with often only one or two daily services. On only three
routes, where a HSR service is offered but not a flight service, the frequency of service is very
high and stands at between 19 and 25 services per day. In terms of air service frequency,
12
out of 43 routes where there is a flight service but no HSR, on only 12 routes the frequency of
service can be considered high, and very high (over 10 per day) on two routes. It appears that
the majority of destinations on which the two modes do not compete there is a relatively low
demand for services to Hongqiao hub (this does not necessarily mean low demand for services
to Shanghai). Such routes, however, might offer more potential for integration between the
modes (see below).

Another way to consider air–rail integration or the lack of it at Hongqiao hub, is to consider
the potential to free runway capacity (as in Givoni and Banister 2006) through mode
substitution. There are 27 destinations within 900 km radius of Hongqiao Airport that are
served by flights but could potentially be served by rail only (Table 5). These destinations
currently take up about third of the runway capacity (in terms of Air Traffic Movements (ATM)
and seat capacity). Looking only at those routes where currently there is already a HSR
service, eight routes (marked by * in Table 5) they take up 17 and 19% of the airport’s ATM
and seat capacity, respectively, and, with the exception of Xiamen, Fuzhou and Zhengzhou,
offer relatively low or modest frequency. The remaining 19 routes, where there is currently
no HSR service, take up 16 and 14% of the airport’s ATM and seat capacity, respectively, and
in general offer low level of service (on 15 routes there are only one or two daily services).
It is clear from Table 5 that the aircraft operated by the airlines from Hongqiao airport are
single-aisle (narrow body) aircraft, many of them small aircraft within this category. This has
implications of the use of runway capacity.
6. Conclusions and discussion

The need to and benefits from integrating the different elements of the transport system are
well recognized (Givoni and Banister 2010) but nevertheless are seldom fully internalized
by policy makers. This is often apparent in the disintegrated planning of the air and rail
networks, even at the age of the HSR, which is recognized on many routes as a potential
substitute to the aircraft. Current HSR plans in the US as in California’s HSR13 and the UK
as in HS214 are two very illustrative examples. China is very different in this respect. China
seems to be the first country to internalize the need for integrated infrastructure, including
the infrastructure for air-rail integration, when planning and developing its HSR network. The
evidence from Shanghai Hongqiao Integrated Transport Hub suggests, however, that this is not
sufficient for airline and railway integration at the operational level, to materialize.

What seem then to stand in the way for a full, beneficial airline and railway integration are
institutional barriers. At the national level, the airline and railway industries are regulated by
different government entities with distinct regulations, revenue sources, cost expenditures,
and operating procedures. The airline industry is more decentralized, operating more like an
oligopoly, with several airlines competing against each other, while the airports are locally
owned and managed. In contrast, the railway industry is a full monopoly. Along several
medium-range corridors (e.g. 300–500 km, and in some cases, up to 900 km as indicated in
Table 5), the two industries directly compete for the same customers. Each industry has its
own self-interests, lacking a revenue/cost sharing mechanism.
Despite the concept of the ‘integrated hub’ being an important element in the development
of the Chinese HSR, it is still a ‘railway’ (State Railways Administration) and not a multimode
(Ministry of Transport) planning initiative. Furthermore, with the operators of rail and
aircraft services in China being profit maximizers, the focus on competition might make them
blind for the full potential of integration. This ‘blindness’ seems to be present also within

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