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Low cost in high-speed train in France. Customer-king and the public service guillotine




                   5.     Conclusion


                   Commercial strategies of SNCF Mobilités and the answers brought back from the clientele,
                   forced (or not) to escape from high prices if it wishes to travel, have amounted to those
                   incontestable truths: a) little by little, low cost according to SNCF is getting more and more
                   degraded. In its “Eurostar Snap” or “TGV pop” versions, the business model (according to
                   marketers) rests on the idea that the train will only leave if enough people on the internet
                   have declared themselves interested. Could we imagine less consideration for the clientele
                   called  “entry  level”?  b) The  implementation  of  low  cost  is  an  experimentation  field  for
                   some dispositions that are then extended to all transport products, whether they be rail or
                   road, by the great public railway firm, something that Kestel and Larue (2016) show very
                   well by studying OUIBUS in parallel with OUIGO.
                   The multimodal policy of SNCF aims at instilling the idea that competition is the source of
                   price reduction in transports, when public investment and most notably a taking up of the
                   debt by public authority would be a surer and preferable alternative in order to lessen the
                   price of the kilometer traveled in train. According to a transport lawyer: “generalization
                   of low cost translates and shows the emergence of a precarious lifestyle, and an existence
                   that is subdued to the laws of marketing. The buying power gained by this service does not
                   put the client-user at the heart of the public service, because of buying without power”
                   (Quessette 2016, p. 23). And finally it is the idea of public service “à la française” (Brouté,
                   2016) itself that is mined by those commercial initiatives.
                   In a press conference, the President of SNCF gave his conception of the client. “I am sure
                   that low cost will be a great success in railways.” “Our clients don’t care at all in what
                   kind of transport they travel: they want price, price, price, simplicity and that it be fluid.
                   After that, it’s better if it’s ecological. So we will never have air transport.” 17 This evokes
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                   the simplistic vision that engineer Taylor had of worker Schmidt as only moved by money,
                   indifferent to the organization of work, its working collectives and hierarchical situation.
                   His only identity was the will to bring back, at whatever cost, more dollars home.
                   If the deregulation of commercial offer is not appealing for public service, we now have
                   enough hindsight to see that it is not a good thing for railway workers. This offer wouldn’t
                   have been possible without a weakening of union resistances and inversely the emergence
                   of low cost, which as we have shown induces always more degraded performances, is an
                   accelerator of this trend. Working conditions in the low cost are a model for the parent
                   company. By paraphrasing M. Carolan (2015), we could say that on the social level, the cost
                   of low cost is indeed very high!
                   We thus have sketched an outline that would have to be continued: under a commercial offer
                   that seems at first sight to be inexpensive, is hidden a sound attack on the idea of equality
                   supposed by French public service. Until the end of the 1960s, it relied – at least on traveler
                   transportation – on the principle of fare equalization and the “obligation to transport”. Or,
                   as explained by Quessette, “now it is the client that has to oblige SNCF in order to travel,
                   and not the contrary.” For the lawyer specialized in transport, this bifurcation was made
                   in 1971, when a decree allowed SNCF autonomy in management. From then on, the idea of
                   “public service” had strongly lost its hold.
                   As for the client, the logic of immediate advantage in which low cost confines him isn’t
                   without any risks: “public service liberates when low cost oppresses. Low cost symbolizes
                   the fall of society and an important part of its population into precariousness.” (Quessette
                   2016, p. 25)

                   4     https://investir.lesechos.fr/actions/actualites/france-la-sncf-anticipera-l-ouverture-a-la-concurrence-1561444.
                   php#pTtOIyhabfSIwA3q.99

                   International Congress on High-speed Rail: Technologies and Long Term Impacts - Ciudad Real (Spain) - 25th anniversary Madrid-Sevilla corridor  441
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